Bentley University

Scholars @ Bentley
Economics Faculty Publications

Department of Economics

2010

The Ties that Binds: Colonies , Culture and Education Among
Immigrants
David Ortmeyer
Bentley University, dortmeyer@bentley.edu

Aaron Jackson
Bentley University, ajackson@bentley.edu

MICHAEL A. QUINN
Bentley University, mquinn@bentley.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.bentley.edu/econ_facpubs
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Ortmeyer, David; Jackson, Aaron; and QUINN, MICHAEL A., "The Ties that Binds: Colonies , Culture and
Education Among Immigrants" (2010). Economics Faculty Publications. 3.
https://scholars.bentley.edu/econ_facpubs/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at Scholars @ Bentley. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholars @ Bentley.

Ortmeyer, Jackson and Quinn, International Journal of Applied Economics, 7(1), September 2010, 28-45

28

The Ties that Bind: Colonies, Culture and Education
Among Immigrants
David L. Ortmeyera, Aaron L. Jacksonb, and Michael A. Quinnc
Bentley University, Massachusetts, USAa,b,c
______________________________________________________________________________
Abstract There is concern among many policy makers of a dual problem: too many immigrants
overall but not enough highly-skilled immigrants. Using recently available data we examine the
factors which influence both the quantity and average educational level of immigrants in OECD
countries in 1990 and 2000. We find that geographic proximity and former colonial
relationships positively influence the overall number of immigrants but are negatively related to
immigrants’ average educational level. By contrast, variables such as greater economic freedom,
more generous asylum policies, and a common language and religion increase both the quantity
and educational level of immigrants. More highly educated immigrants also appear to be more
concerned with low unemployment rates among high-skilled workers in destination countries
than in income differences between the destination and source countries. These results suggest
that highlighting cultural similarities of destination countries can be an important feature of
programs designed to attract high-skilled immigrants. Government reforms regarding asylum
policies and economic regulation may also increase a country’s appeal to higher-skilled
immigrants.
Keywords: Immigration, colonial, education, language, religion.
JEL Classification: F2, J1, J6
______________________________________________________________________________

1. Introduction and Background
The number of people living outside their country of origin has risen significantly in the last two
decades, increasing from 155 million in 1990 to an estimated 214 million by 2010 (UN, 2009).
The percentage of the foreign-born population in Western European countries is projected to
double by mid-century (Coleman, 2008). This dramatic rise in the international movement of
people has made immigration a pressing political issue in many countries. This is reflected in
elections such as Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and the gains from anti-immigration parties in the
2009 EU parliamentary elections (BBC, 2009). Despite widespread domestic banking problems
and the war in Afghanistan, polls in the United Kingdom have ranked immigration as voters’ top
concern (TNS, 2008). The state of Arizona in the United States recently passed a law requiring
police to detain anyone who they “reasonably suspect” may be an illegal immigrant (Archibold,
2010). The accompanying tightening of immigration laws reflects citizens’ concerns about the
impact of immigrants on unemployment, wages, crime rates and social welfare programs. These
concerns are accentuated by the recessions experienced in destination countries. While the
discussion is often about how many immigrants are (or should be) entering a country, the root of
many people’s concern is actually more about the skill level of those entering the country.
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Lower skilled immigrants are often seen as more likely to be a drain on public resources and the
economy, than the highly skilled. In immigration policy, the issue is one of both quantity and
quality.
Research focusing on explaining the number of immigrants has identified a significant number of
“push” and “pull” factors. This includes earnings variables such as wage/income and
employment differentials. 1 Variables such as distance and migration stocks/networks have been
found to significantly impact the cost of migration (Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2002; Clark,
Hatton and Williamson, 2002; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes, 2003; Mckenzie and Rapoport, 2007;
Stampini, Carletto and Davis, 2008). Some models include variables such as inequality in the
source country as a “push” factor (Hatton and Williamson, 2002; Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004;
Quinn, 2006). Recently, models have started including variables which capture special
“cultural” relationships between the source and destination country such as having a common
language or a former colonial relationship (Mayda, 2005; Pederson, Pytlikova and Smith, 2004).
Recent literature has widened the focus to include the educational quality of immigrants.
The “brain drain” literature has focused primarily on whether migration benefits or harms the
source and (sometimes destination) countries. 2 While these studies have been done for decades,
none has used educational information on international immigration across a large pairing of
countries because the data was simply not available. Data most commonly existed for one single
source or destination country. 3 These studies have examined factors such as the impact of
emigrants on source country labor markets, remittances and development. Several “brain drain”
studies have found negative effects of migration on sending countries and some have even
proposed taxing emigrants as compensation. 4
Recently available data on the educational levels of the stock of various source country
immigrants in destination countries allows us to analyze both the quantity and quality
dimensions of migration. For example, Rosenzweig (2010) compares the impact of cross-country
variation in schooling versus skill pricing differentials on global inequality. Our study utilizes
the data set by Docquier and Marfouk (2006), which includes information on the educational
composition of migrant stocks for the years 1990 and 2000. Only those two years are available in
the data set. Marfouk (2008), studies African immigration, including a dummy variable for
former colonial relationship and finds this has a positive impact on the educational level of
immigrants. In this study, he examines migration among 53 African source countries and 30
OECD destination countries. Our paper builds directly on the work of Marfouk, with some
notable differences in sample and focus, as discussed below.
Examining both the size and educational levels of migrant stocks is an important topic as
destination countries often prefer highly-skilled immigrants. Considerable research has been
done on the potentially detrimental effects of low-skilled immigrants on labor markets and
government spending (Borjas 1985, 1994, 1995; Baker and Benjamin, 1994). Research has also
focused on what helps to make immigrants successful in a destination country (Chiswick and
Miller, 1992; Funkhouser, 2005; Hammarstedt, 2009). There are many examples of government
programs intended to promote high-skilled immigration. During the sample timeframe, the
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand all had selective immigration programs which
put aside visas for workers with desirable skills. 5 Similar programs have since been adopted by
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the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
(Doomernik et al, 2009). This emphasis on attracting highly-skilled immigrants is perhaps best
seen in the new Blue Card system in the European Union. Blue Card provides a renewable twoyear right to work for highly skilled immigrants with job offers in the European Union (Sebesta,
2009).
This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the determinants of both the size of
migration stocks and their average educational level across a large number of country pairs in
two time periods, with a special emphasis on colonial relationships. In our analysis, we examine
the impact of colonial relationships on migration and then break this relationship down into
various sub-components which reflect the depth of this colonial relationship such as common
language, common religion and the amount of time spent as a colony. We distinguish between
variables which impact the size of migrant stocks and those which impact the educational levels
of those stocks, but estimate these equations jointly since many determinants influence both
simultaneously. This approach allows us to see how factors such as colonial relationships and
proximity (for example) increase the quantity of immigrants but lower the average skill level of
those immigrants. On the other hand, a factor such as common language increases both the
quantity of immigrants and their average educational level. It is important to note that the focus
of our paper is not limited to the number of emigrating high-skilled workers, but applies to the
average educational level of all immigrants. Thus, our paper is not a “brain drain” paper as it
utilizes data on immigrants of varying educational levels.
The next section outlines our theoretical framework, which is then followed by a discussion of
the data set and variables employed. The empirical methodology and results are then discussed.
The paper concludes with a discussion on the implications for policy.
2. Modeling Framework
We follow a simple modeling framework similar to that discussed by Marfouk (2008), where
immigrants choose to emigrate depending on ‘pull’ factors from destination countries, ‘push’
factors from source countries, and explicit and implicit costs incurred by immigrating. Our
analysis is focused on understanding the social and demographic nature of the immigration
process, so the following model will focus mainly on the destination pull factors affecting the
migration decision.
Immigrant i’s expected return from migrating to the destination country d can be represented as

.
Expected utility of immigrant i,

(1)

, is determined by four basic components. The vector of

captures the ease with which immigrants may enter the destination country, for
variables
instance, through the benefits of colonial ties, reciprocal immigration or labor mobility
agreements (such as the Schengen agreement), asylum procedures, or other immigration policies.
The vector
represent factors specific to the individual (other than human capital as
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captured in
) that affect the return to immigration in the destination country, such as religion
or language skills. Language skills affect the return to education; knowing a country’s language
is more important for workers in highly skilled industries. The vector
is a set of country
specific factors that influence the immigrants overall well-being, such as employment
opportunities, income potential, or institutional arrangements.
captures the amount of human
capital the potential immigrant possesses. If a source country has a more highly educated labor
force then there is a higher probability that any single immigrant from that country will have a
. Mayda (2005) suggests the destination returns to immigration
,
, and
higher
should be conditional on the probability of immigrants entering the country as indicated by
,
as not accounting for the conditional probability will overstate the true returns to immigrating.
Since we are more concerned with the significance of these factors rather than the magnitude, we
include them here and in the empirical model as separate regressors. The coefficients
then
represent the marginal returns to the immigrant in the destination country for each of the relevant
then represents all other unobservable factors which affect the returns
factors. The error term
to immigration in the destination country.
,
If immigrant i were to remain in the source country s, she would earn the expected return
where a similar set of factors from equation (1) represent expected returns in the source country:
,
(2)
where the vectors
,
,
, coefficients , and error term
to the destination country counterpart in equation (1).

have a similar interpretation

The immigrant will incur costs in moving from the source to the destination country, both
explicitly and implicitly, in the process of immigration. These costs for immigrant i are
expressed as:
.
(3)
The vector
represents country-pair specific costs to immigrating, such as distance between
countries, whether colonial links exist, or if the two countries share a common language. The
variables included in the vector
in some cases may be considered either a cost or benefit,
and hence is included in equations (1) – (3). For instance, if immigrants speak a second language
which is dominant in the destination country, this could be viewed as a ‘negative cost’, or a
benefit. However, not speaking the local language would clearly be costly to the immigrant.
Thus, the immigrant will choose to immigrate whenever
This condition
forms the basis for the econometric analysis to follow. As the data are from actual immigrants
(as opposed to potential immigrants), this condition holds for our data sample. Thus, our
estimated coefficient vectors should be accordingly interpreted as the returns to (actual)
immigration for the relevant factors, which are discussed in greater detail in the next section.
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3. Data and Variables
The data set consists of observations on migration stocks between country pairs from two years:
1990 and 2000 6 . Our analysis includes 22 immigrant receiving (destination) countries, 7 and as
many as 169 sending (source) countries. The source countries exhibit considerable diversity in
terms of development levels, cultural heritage, political, and economic systems. The destination
countries are all OECD members. The number of observations in our regressions range from
2,361 to 3,999 (depending on the specification).
There are two main dependent variables of interest in our analysis: the size of migrant stocks
between country pairs, and the average educational level of these immigrants. Both of these
variables are taken from the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set. The size of the stock of
migrants from source country s in destination country d is denoted as Msd and is converted to
logs in the regressions for scaling purposes. The average educational level of immigrant stocks is
denoted as Esd and is measured as the average number of years of schooling of the stock of
migrants from source country s in destination country d.
A major goal of this paper is to examine the impact of cultural ties resulting from former colonial
relationships on migration. Previous literature has modeled this through the use of a simple
colony dummy variable. We have sought to go beyond this method by including the number of
years the relationship existed and specific dummies for language and religious commonalities
that result from long-standing colonial ties. Note that including both a colonial dummy and a
common language dummy (for example) would be inappropriate because of problems with
collinearity. One could imagine other variables reflecting cultural similarities which result from a
colonial past (e.g. common educational systems), but unfortunately an appropriate classification
system is not available.
Data to construct the colonial variables, the common religion, and language dummies are taken
from the CIA World Factbook (2009). If both the source and destination country share one of the
same official languages, the common language value equals 1. To construct the common religion
dummy, we determined the percentage of the population adhering to one of four major faiths Christian, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist. If more than 50% of the population adheres to a
particular religion, it is declared a majority religion. If both the source and destination country
share the same majority religion, the dummy takes on a value equal to 1. Finally, length of the
colonial relationship is defined as the year of independence minus the year of initial colonization.
In addition to the cultural variables there are a number of control variables reflecting various
push and pull factors impacting migration. 8 Due to data constraints some of these are only
available for the destination (OECD) countries. There are three measures of unemployment used
in the regressions, all of which are only available for destination countries. Long term
unemployment is taken from the World Bank’s online World Development Indicators (WDI)
database and represents the share of total unemployment that is considered long term (those who
have been looking for work for 12 months or longer). The unemployment rates of those with
primary and tertiary education are constructed from WDI (2009), OECD (2008), and Docquier
and Marfouk (2006). They are defined as the number of unemployed with primary (tertiary)
education as a percentage of the primary (tertiary) educated labor force. Wage differentials
between destination and source countries are proxied by differences in GDP per capita and come
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from WDI (2009), measured in constant 2000 US dollars. The index of economic freedom in the
destination country is compiled by the Heritage Foundation (Heritage, 2008). This measure of
economic freedom has been used in several economic studies (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles,
2003; Goel and Nelson, 2005; Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998). Distance between
country capitals is measured in kilometers and taken from the CEPII database (CEPII, 2009). A
dummy variable for the year is included, set equal to 1 for 1990. For the educational level
regressions only, we constructed a migrant stock variable based on OECD data (OECD Trends in
International Migration (OECD, 1997 and 2004). This variable was used in the average
educational level regressions to forestall any possible endogeneity issues associated with using
the same data set to construct both the educational level dependent variable and the migrant
stock covariate.
Two variables are included as policy controls, capturing the openness of the destination countries
to immigration. A Schengen agreement dummy, consistent with the work of Grogger and
Hanson (2008), equals 1 if the source and destination countries are both signatories of the
Schengen agreement (or later convention) on borderless travel during the observation year. Since
the signatories were EU countries, this reflects immigration ease within most of the European
Union countries. 9 A second variable, measuring the percent of asylum seekers accepted by the
destination countries, is taken from the UN Refugee Handbook. It is defined as the total number
of accepted asylum applications over the range 1990-1999 divided by the total number of
applications over that year range. 10
Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are provided in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Migrant Stock (D&M) ('000s)

11.37

96.76

0.00

6,374.83

Average Education Level (years)

11.64

2.10

6.00

16.00

Dest - Longterm Unemployed Share (%)

32.45

18.28

5.00

70.00

7.06

5.52

0.25

23.22

Dest - Primary Educ. Unemployment Rate (%)
Dest - Tertiary Educ. Unemployment Rate (%)

0.22

0.23

0.04

0.98

Dest - Freedom

69.25

5.88

57.40

80.90

Difference GDP percapita: Dest-Source ('000s)

17.10

11.44

-35.26

46.19

Common Religion Dummy

0.14

0.34

0

1

Common Language Dummy

0.04

0.20

0

1

Schengen Dummy

0.04

0.20

0

1

Colonial Relationship Dummy

0.03

0.17

0

1

Year Dummy (1990=1)

0.50

0.50

0

1

Migrant Stock (OECD) ('000s)

9.87

122.39

0.00

9,336.72

Distance (km)

6,986.85

4,368.46

59.62

19,586.18

Source - Gini

40.30

10.76

19.40

74.33

32,400.00

120,000.00

42.03

1,260,000.00

0.11

0.10

0.01

0.48

Source - Population ('000s)
Percent of Asylum Seekers Accepted (%)
Years As Colony (years)

161.00

125.00

0.00

721.00

Source - Labor Force with Primary Educ. (%)

0.65

0.22

0.06

0.98

Source - Labor Force with Tertiary Educ. (%)

0.09

0.08

0.01

0.51
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There are some control variables included that are specific to the source countries. These include
variables for inequality (Gini coefficient) and source country population, both taken from WDI
(2009). Inclusion of the economic freedom index in the destination country precludes the
inclusion of the destination Gini coefficient as this would cause severe multicollinearity. There
are also variables for the percent of the source country labor force with primary and tertiary
education. This data comes from Docquier and Marfouk (2006).
3.1 Variable Predictions
Cultural similarities between the source and destination country may make immigrant
assimilation easier (Levitt, 2003; Ono, 2002). This raises the return to the skills that migrants
bring and generates more sizable immigration. An immigrant who speaks the destination
country language (for example) will find jobs more plentiful and not be restricted to employment
in immigrant enclaves or lower skilled occupations where compensation might be less. We
would expect cultural similarities to also have a positive effect on the education level of
immigrants, because the return to common language will be greater the more highly educated the
immigrant. For example, speaking the language of the destination country is likely to be more
important for an office worker than for a housekeeper. In addition, more highly educated
migrants are likely to be more influenced by non-economic factors, like cultural similarities.
Colonial relationships can also be a strong cultural influence (Burton, 1999; Cooper, 2005;
Thompson, 2000). Our basic hypothesis then is that country pairs with colonial relationships,
particularly long-lived relationships, tend to be culturally similar in important ways and therefore
tend to generate larger and more highly educated immigrant flows resulting in larger and better
educated migrant stocks over time. We explore this hypothesis using three regression variants.
Variant 1 is a highly aggregative analysis where we regress separately the migrant stocks and
average educational level of the stocks against a colonial dummy variable and a set of control
variables. The colonial dummy masks a set of complex underlying cultural similarities, and
while the impact on total migration is expected to be positive, the impact on the average
educational level is uncertain and requires a more refined analysis. It is important to note that a
colonial dummy is not equivalent to a common language dummy, but proxies for a set of
similarities like language, religion, legal and educational systems, etc.
A more complex analysis (Variant 2), replaces the colonial dummy with variables targeting two
specific cultural similarities – language and religion. 11 Here we would expect to find that
positive relationships exist between the common language and common religion dummies and
both the size of immigration and the average educational level of immigrants.
Variant 3 focuses exclusively on country pairs with colonial relationships and analyzes the
length of the colonial relationship in addition to the common language and religion dummies
(again along with other control variables). Since these regressions control for cultural
similarities, any additional impact of the length of the colonial relationship must have a different
underlying rationale. Our hypothesis is that the longer the colonial relationship, the better
information exists regarding the “mother country” and the lower the costs of migration. This
should translate into more sizable migration and make it more likely that lower educated
individuals would migrate.
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Many of the control variables have predictions which are based in well established literatures.
The migrant stock variable in the regressions analyzing educational level attempts to capture the
network effects of an existing base of migrants in the destination country and should be
negatively related to the average educational level of immigrants. 12 The larger the migrant stock
in the destination country, the more likely migrant enclaves are to exist, and the easier it is for
low-skilled migrants to be absorbed. Network effects have been shown to reduce migration costs
in numerous studies including Gorlich and Trebesch (2008), Curran and Rivero-Fuentes (2003),
Massey (1990) and Stark (1991). Transportation costs should be negatively related to total
migration and positively related to the average educational level since more highly educated
individuals have more resources at their disposal, making longer migrations feasible. The source
country population variable’s coefficient should be positive in regressions where the dependent
variable is the migrant stock, since countries with larger populations will tend to send out more
immigrants (in absolute terms).
According to neoclassical theories of migration, we would expect real wage differences between
destination and source countries to be positively related to migration stocks. Because skillspecific wage data for the sample periods is unavailable, we were forced to proxy average wage
levels by GDP per capita in the destination and source countries. While we might find the
positive relationship we expect for migration stocks, it is less likely that any significant insight
will be gained for the average educational level of migrants, where skill-specific wage
differences are most relevant.
We would expect unemployment conditions in the destination country to be important in the
decision to migrate. A perception of long-term unemployment in the destination country is most
relevant as a determinant of the size of the stock of immigrants, whereas skill/education-specific
unemployment rates are more relevant determinants of the skill level of the migrant stock as
measured by the average educational level. We expect higher long-term unemployment in the
destination country will discourage migration and hence reduce the size of the migrant stock.
Long-term unemployment rates may also be a proxy for labor market rigidities which can be
important for immigrants seeking employment in the destination country. Higher unemployment
rates for those with primary education in the destination country should discourage migration of
the low-skilled and hence raise the educational level of migrants (a positive and significant
coefficient). Higher unemployment rates for those with tertiary-education should discourage the
relatively high skilled and lower the average educational level of migrants (a negative and
significant coefficient).
Other control variables include measures of the educational level of the labor force in the source
country. We expect the larger the percentage of primary educated workers in the source country
labor force, the greater the lower educated migration and hence a reduction in the average
educational level of migrants. Similarly, the larger the percentage of tertiary educated workers in
the source country labor force, the greater the amount of highly educated and hence an increase
in the average educational level of migrants. Greater economic freedom in the destination
country should attract better educated migrants, hence increasing the size and average
educational level of migrants. Greater inequality in the source country implies a greater
incentive to migrate and may lead to more highly educated emigrants (Liebig and Sousa-Poza,
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2004). Finally our two policy controls measuring the degree of openness of the destination
country should have positive impacts on both the size and educational level of total migrant
stocks. The more open the destination country, as measured by either the percent of asylum
applications accepted, or a Schengen agreement, the greater and more highly educated are
immigrants.
4. Empirical Methodology
It is tempting to treat estimation of the two dependent variables ln (Msd ) and (Esd) as a simple
application of individual equation OLS. All the classical assumptions seem to be met, especially
the exogeneity of the regressors, which, while not identical, are similar in the two equations.
However there are linkages across the equation that involve the disturbances. Many of the factors
that determine the number and average educational level of immigrants are the same and this is
likely to be true of any omitted variables that might be part of the error terms. Hence the error
terms across the two equations are likely to be correlated and these correlations can provide
additional information that should be captured to provide efficient estimates. We therefore
estimated the equations jointly using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model.
We applied joint iterative SUR estimation to three variants. Variant 1 used vectors of control
variables (X and Y) and a colonial dummy (CD) on the entire sample. These control vectors,
while similar, were not identical in each equation. Variant 2 used the same vectors of control
variables but with common language (CL) and religion (CR) dummies replacing the aggregative
colonial dummy, again using the entire sample. Variant 3 looked only at country pairs that had
past colonial ties and added “years as colony” (YAC) to the set of variables used in Variant 2. 13
+ ε 1 (4a)

+ ε 2 (4b)

d

Ys

︵ E sd ) = η + η1CD + η′2
0

′

d
s

︵ M sd ) = β 0 + β 1 CD +

X
β2

n
l

Variant 1

) = γ 0 + γ 1 CL + γ 2 CR + γ '3

+ υ 1 (5a)

+ υ2

d

︵ E sd ) = α + α 1CL + α 2 CR + α
0

'
3

d
s

sd

Ys

M

X

n
l

Variant 2

︵

(5b)

sd

) = δ 0 + δ 1 CL + δ 2 CR + δ 3 YAC + δ '4

+ ω2

+ ω1

(6a)

d

︵ E sd ) = φ + φ1CL + φ 2 CR + φ 3YAC + φ 3'
0

Ys

M

d
s

︵

X

n
l

Variant 3

(6b)

The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity and independence of the equations was calculated
for each variant. In each case the null hypothesis of independence was rejected suggesting that
the variance/covariance matrix of residuals was not diagonal and therefore that joint estimation
was appropriate for efficient estimation. The variance inflation factor (VIF) was used to check
for multi-collinearity among the covariates 14 .
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5. Results
The empirical results are largely consistent with our predictions: factors which lower the cost of
migration have a tendency to reduce the educational level of migrants. Results are shown in
Tables 2 and 3 below. Examining the impact of cultural similarity on migration we find that a
simple colonial dummy shows a positive impact on the number of immigrants from a former
colony in the “mother” country, as expected, but a negative impact on the educational level of
those immigrants. As stated earlier, however, a single colonial dummy is not sufficient to
understand the impact of complex underlying cultural similarities on educational levels, despite
the fact that many papers in the literature have tended to use colonial relationship and common
language interchangeably. However, introducing common language and common religion
variables in place of the colonial dummy leads to interesting results.
Common language, for example, positively impacts the stock of source country migrants in the
destination country and the educational level of those migrants, whereas the colonial dummy
alone impacted educational level negatively. The common religion variable is also strongly
positive and significant in both the educational level and migrant stock regressions. Together
these variables suggest that cultural similarity is a strong draw and that more highly educated
workers may place more value on cultural similarities than do lower educated workers.
The asylum variable is positive and significant in both the size and educational level regressions.
The impact of colonial ties may also vary based on the length of time as a colony. The colonial
length variable is positive and significant regarding total number of immigrants but is negative
and significant with regards to their educational level. This is as predicted since source countries
with longer colonial ties will have more information on the destination country and therefore
lower migration costs. Lower migration costs results in more immigrants from the source
country, but with a lower average educational level. Similarly, the closer geographically source
and destination countries are, the greater the number of immigrants from that source country in
the destination country and the lower the educational level.
Greater economic freedom seems to attract both more immigrants and more highly educated
ones. Not surprisingly, source countries with higher (lower) educated labor forces tend to have
higher (lower) educated emigrants. Also, as predicted, destination countries with higher rates of
unemployment among highly educated workers tend to attract less of them. Similarly, higher
rates of unemployment among primary educated workers was found to have a positive impact on
the educational level of migrants (by attracting fewer less educated workers). High rates of
overall long-term unemployment in the destination labor force was unexpectedly positively
related to the number of immigrants. This, however, may be an instance of spurious correlation
since many destination countries with long-term structural unemployment issues in some labor
segments are also magnets for immigrants in other (unskilled) segments. The labor markets that
are relevant for immigrants (especially unskilled) may not be the labor markets marked by longterm unemployment, so caution must be exercised in attributing any causal relationship. Source
countries with larger populations were found to have a higher number of immigrants abroad.
Source country inequality has an unexpectedly negative effect on the size of migrant stocks in
the destination country, but appears to have little effect on the educational level of immigrants.
Differences in GDP also had mixed results, being insignificant in four out of six regressions.
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Table 2. SUR Estimates for Total Number of Source Country Migrants in Destination
Variant 1
(All Countries)

Variant 2
(All Countries)

Variant 3
(Colonies Only)

3.08
(.175)***

-

-

Common Religion

-

0.38
(.11)***

0.50
(.123)***

Common Language

-

1.29
(.142)***

1.65
(.176)***

Years As Colony

-

-

0.003
(0.0004)***

Dest. Longterm Unemployment

0.01
(.002)***

0.01
(.002)***

0.02
(.003)***

Dest. Freedom

0.11
(.006)***

0.10
(.007)***

0.10
(.008)***

Log(Difference in GDP per capita)

-0.22
(.087)***

-0.09
(.091)

0.96
(.234)***

Log(Distance)

-0.86
(.041)***

-0.85
(.043)***

-0.90
(.070)***

Source Gini

-0.03
(.004)***

-0.04
(.004)***

-0.04
(.005)***

Log(Source Population)

0.79
(.021)***

0.77
(.021)***

0.77
(.028)***

Percent of Asylum Seekers Accepted

7.26
(.314)***

7.12
(.324)***

6.93
(.41)***

Year Dummy

-0.22
(.071)***

-0.18
(.073)***

0.06
(.106)

0.28
(.141)**

0.18
(.14)

-

0.44
3999.00
3275.49
0.00

0.41
3999.00
2942.07
0.00

0.40
2361.00
1614.43
0.00

Variables
Colonial Relationship

Schengen
2

R
Number of Observations
Chi-Squared
Significance

Note: Coefficients shown with standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 3. SUR Estimates for Average Educational Level of Immigrants
Variant 1
(All Countries)

Variant 2
(All Countries)

Variant 3
(Colonies Only)

-1.16
(.155)***

-

-

Common Religion

-

1.06
(.094)***

1.07
(.11)***

Common Language

-

0.32
(.122)***

0.53
(.16)***

Years As Colony

-

-

-0.0008
(.0003)**

Dest. Primary Educ. Unemployment Rate

0.06
(.006)***

0.05
(.006)***

0.06
(.008)***

Dest. Tertiary Educ. Unemployment Rate

-0.88
(.16)***

-0.80
(.16)***

-0.96
(.23)***

0.13
(.006)***

0.11
(.005)***

0.12
(.007)***

-0.02
(.086)

0.08
(.085)

0.30
(.232)

0.27
(.037)***

0.29
(.037)***

0.33
(0.06)***

-0.01
(.014)

-0.01
(.013)

-0.01
(.018)

0.01
(.003)***

-0.01
(.004)

0.006
(.004)

Source LF with Primary Educ

-1.28
(.22)***

-1.46
(.22)***

-1.15
(.351)***

Source LF with Tertiary Educ

2.10
(.53)***

1.09
(.53)**

1.11
(.87)

0.79
(.34)**

0.51
(.331)

0.90
(.44)**

-0.41
(.11)***

-0.41
(.106)***

-0.28
(.14)*

-0.17
(.12)

-0.11
(.12)

-

0.28
3999.00
1689.89
0.00

0.29
3999.00
1805.48
0.00

0.32
2361.00
1184.40
0.00

Variables
Colonial Relationship

Dest. Freedom
Log(Difference in GDP per capita)
Log(Distance)
Log(Migrant Stock)
Source Gini

Percent of Asylum Seekers Accepted
Year Dummy
Schengen
2

R
Number of Observations
Chi-Squared
Significance

Note: Coefficients shown with standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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6. Conclusion
Many countries have a preference for receiving high versus low-skilled immigrants. Higher
skilled immigrants are often perceived as more likely to be employed and less likely to use
government services or to cause social problems. The results in this paper address this issue and
have implications for both the literature and policy. Our empirical evidence suggests some
factors which increase the ease of immigration to a country (such as geographic proximity) may
also promote low-skilled immigration.
The results also imply that a colonial relationship is too complex to be modeled by a simple
dummy variable, as has been done in the past. This colonial dummy can mask the impacts of
factors such as common language and religion versus the length of time spent as a colony. When
one moves beyond the colonial dummy variable it becomes apparent that higher educated
immigrants appear to place more value on cultural factors such as common language and
religion. This suggests that making immigrants feel culturally at home is especially important in
attracting high-skilled immigrants.
Another important policy implication is the importance of economic reforms. There is evidence
that highly-skilled immigrants are attracted to countries that offer significant economic returns to
the highly educated. These are the countries with greater levels of economic freedom. Results
also imply that having a more open asylum policy can help draw more highly educated
immigrants. Together these results suggest that a destination country wanting to become a
magnet for high-skilled immigrants may need to implement significant economic and possibly
even cultural reforms. This has especially important implications for the European Union. The
EU has been trying to fulfill the Lisbon Agenda of becoming a magnet for highly-skilled,
innovative immigrants, while at the same time, individual member countries have resisted
economic reforms (such as more open labor markets). Perhaps they must fulfill one goal to
achieve the other.
Endnotes
1

This goes back to the work of Harris and Todaro (1970) and is now common in most migration
models. A few examples are Jewell and Molina (2009), Massey et al, (1994) and Stark and
Taylor (1991).
2

There is a long literature on “brain drain” including work such as Beine, Docquier and
Rapoport (2007, 2008), Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk (2007), Docquier and Schiff (2009),
Le(2008), Chen(2009) , Cattaneo(2009) and Lien and Wang (2005) that examines the
educational disparities between emigrants and the native population in LDCs and the impact on
sending countries.
3

4

For example, see Aydemir and Robinson’s (2008) work on immigrants in Canada.

For a discussion of the Bhagwati tax proposal see Bhagwati and Dellalfar (1973), Devoretz and
Maki (1975), and Oldmand and Pomp (1975).
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5

Testing the impact of these programs is difficult as including a dummy variable for “selective
immigration programs” is nearly identical as testing for English language destination (there is a
0.87 correlation coefficient between the two variables). We tested for this in our sample and
found the two variables had virtually identical results.
6
Only these two years are available in the data set.
7

The destination countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
8

Some of these variables were converted to logs for scaling purposes.

9

Notable exceptions to this agreement are Ireland and the United Kingdom.

10

Unfortunately, it is not possible to get earlier asylum data for all destination countries.

11

Note that other cultural similarity variables like educational system and legal system were not
possible to generate because of the absence of a suitable classification system.
12

We ran supplementary regressions treating migrant stocks as a lagged dependent variable in
regressions of the total stock (Msd) and found the results to be robust. The R2 was much higher,
as you would expect.

13

Because the dependent variables cannot assume negative values, it is possible that the
estimates are inconsistent. We ran regressions using a Tobit estimation model as a check and
discovered that the results were robust. Tobit results are available on request.

14

VIF statistics were all under 3 when equations were run individually indicating no significant
multicollinearity in the regressions.
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